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Abstract 
 
 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm disclosure for 
firms in crisis, specifically firms in violation of GAAP, may differ from the 
relationship demonstrated in prior literature between governance and voluntary 
disclosure.  An emerging stream of disclosure literature assumes that the 
relationship between corporate governance and misstatement disclosure choices 
mirror that found in prior voluntary disclosure literature though no study has 
empirically demonstrated that a similar relationship exists.  Using a sample of 
302 accounting irregularities disclosed between 2000 and 2006, I investigate the 
role of corporate governance, including both internal and external mechanisms, 
in influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness.  I provide empirical evidence 
consistent with the value of in-the-money stock options incentivizing 
management to disclose material misstatements in a less timely manner and a 
non-linear relationship between management ownership and timeliness where 
lower levels of ownership improve timeliness and higher levels of ownership 
inhibit timeliness.  The results also suggest that greater board independence, 
CFO turnover prior to the end of the misstated period, and greater risk of civil 
litigation improve misstatement disclosure timeliness, while greater board size 
and board classification have the opposite effect. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decade and as recently as 2011, the U.S. Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has voiced its concern with the lack of urgency 
demonstrated by firms in disclosing misstatements uncovered in the firm’s prior 
financials.  A preliminary look at the timeliness of misstatement disclosures 
reveals that the SEC has good reason to be concerned.  In 2006, the final year in 
this study’s sample, 74 of 200 misstatements (37%) were disclosed more than 
two fiscal quarters after the end of the affected financials.   
While it is unlikely that the time taken to disclose a misstatement is driven 
entirely by management, strategic behavior may reduce misstatement disclosure 
timeliness if utility maximizing managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) seek to 
avoid losses of personal wealth and reputation (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 
2009) due to firm value destruction accompanying misstatement revelations 
(Ettridge et al., 2010; Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008a; Palmrose, Richardson, 
Scholz, 2004; Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; 
Srinivasan, 2005). 
Assuming investors prefer more timely financial information over less 
timely when making investment decisions, management’s actions to disclose in a 
less timely manner are inconsistent with investor preferences.  As a solution to 
the agency costs associated with this inconsistent behavior, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) theorize that shareholders can employ compensation incentives 
and incur monitoring costs in an effort to better align management’s incentives 
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with their own.  While the prior misstatement disclosure literature has 
investigated the consequences of strategic misstatement disclosures such as 
Files (2011) investigation into the association between disclosure timeliness and 
the likelihood and level of SEC penalties and Myers, Scholz, and Sharp (2011) 
investigation into the market’s reaction to management’s choice of more obscure 
disclosure venues, no study has investigated the role of corporate governance in 
influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness. 
There is sufficient reason to believe that the role of corporate governance 
in influencing misstatement disclosure choices may differ from prior evidence of 
its relationship with voluntary disclosures such as management forecasts.  Daily, 
Dalton, and Cannella (2003) argue that the relationship between governance and 
firm performance is situation dependent thus limiting generalizability.  They 
explain that the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance can vary between a firm in crisis and a firm not in crisis.  In the case 
of financial misstatements, firms that violate GAAP are often in crisis as 
evidenced by their poor performance, high leverage, and limited cash-flow from 
operations (Ettridge et al., 2010; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2010; 
Palmrose et al., 2004; Richardson, Tuna, and Wu, 2002; Kinney and McDaniel, 
1989).  This is the opposite of firms disclosing earnings forecasts which are often 
better performers (Lev and Penman, 1980; Miller, 2002).  The association 
between misstatement disclosure and changes in stock liquidity and cost of 
capital following disclosure is consistent with a firm in crisis.  While management 
forecasts (i.e. voluntary disclosure) increase stock liquidity and reduce cost of 
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capital (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), misstatement 
disclosures result in the opposite and increase bid-ask spreads1 (Anderson and 
Yohn, 2002), decrease stock liquidity (Bardos, 2011), and increase cost of capital 
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Kravet and Shevlin, 
2010).       
Using a comprehensive model including both internal and external 
governance mechanisms and a sample of 302 accounting irregularities disclosed 
between 2000 and 2006, I present empirical evidence of corporate governance 
influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness.  Specifically, I demonstrate 
evidence consistent with the value of in-the-money stock options incentivizing 
management to disclose misstatements in a less timely manner and a non-linear 
relationship between management ownership and timeliness where the evidence 
is consistent with low levels of ownership improving timeliness and high levels of 
ownership reducing timeliness.  I also find that while greater board 
independence, CFO turnover prior to the end of the misstated period, and the 
firm’s litigation environment are all associated with more timely misstatement 
disclosures, greater board size and board classes are associated with less timely 
misstatement disclosures.  The findings also provide empirical evidence that 
timeliness varies with the type of accounting issue involved in the misstatement. 
The remainder of the paper is organized into the following sections.  
Section 2 discusses the underlying theory and develops expectations.  Section 3 
describes the sample selection.  Section 4 outlines the methodology and variable 
                                                          
1
 Huberman and Halka (2001) and Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999) demonstrate a negative 
relationship between bid-ask spread and stock liquidity. 
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definitions.  Section 5 discusses the empirical results.  Section 6 discusses 
additional analysis.  Section 7 concludes. 
2. Theory and Expectations 
2.1 Misstatement disclosure timeliness 
Between 2000 and 20062, the market witnessed a seven-fold increase in 
the number of disclosures identifying material misstatements in prior financial 
reports (Scholz, 2008; GAO3, 2002; GAO, 2006) and lost over $36 billion in 
market capitalization as a result (GAO, 2006).  Figure 1 provides a preliminary 
look at the timeliness of accounting error and irregularity disclosures over the 
same period extracted from the GAO Financial Restatement Database.4  On 
average, one-third (one-tenth) of the misstatements were disclosed more than 
two (four) fiscal quarters following the end of the misstated period (i.e. after 
management resumed reporting in accordance with GAAP). 
This high frequency of less-than-timely disclosure has raised considerable 
concern from regulators over the last decade.  In response to the accounting 
scandals of 2002 (e.g. Enron) and in clear  acknowledgement of the existing 
issue of untimely misstatement disclosures, Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) mandated that public issuers disclose material changes in financial 
condition in an urgent manner (SOX, 2002).  The SEC, charged with protecting 
                                                          
2
 Because of restrictions on the availability of required data the study is limited to the period 2000-
2006 
3
 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
4
 Data for the figure is limited to accounting errors and irregularities identified in the GAO 
Financial Restatement Database for which an end-date for the misstatement period is identified in 
Audit Analytics.  
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public investors, implemented the SOX mandate in August 2004 with the release 
of Final Rule: Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of 
Filing Date (Final Rule 8-K).  In Final Rule 8-K, the SEC added a number of new 
corporate information events to the list of those requiring a Form 8-K submission 
including the determination of the management, auditor, or board that “previously 
issued financial statements covering one or more years or interim periods no 
longer should be relied upon because of an error in such financial statements” 
(SEC, 2004).  In addition, the SEC shortened the Form 8-K submission deadline 
from 15 days to four days after occurrence of the event to “provide investors with 
better and faster disclosure of important corporate events” (SEC, 2004).  Post 
Final Rule 8-K, timeliness remains a significant concern.  In August 2008, the 
Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (ACIFR) final report 
to the SEC encouraged the regulatory body to further stress timely identification 
and disclosure of erroneous financials (ACIFR, 2008) and as recently as 
December 2011, the SEC reiterated its mandate “to require clear and timely 
disclosure by the market participants it oversees” and to ensure that a “very real 
threat of swift and stern enforcement” exists for those who do not meet these 
obligations (Gallagher, 2011).  
2.2 Strategic misstatement disclosure 
Although management is responsible for notifying investors when an error 
or otherwise misleading information is detected in prior financial statements 
(APB; FASB), managers may take actions to withhold such a disclosure.  Agency 
theory holds that utility maximizing managers may behave in a manner 
6 
 
inconsistent with the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
For example, according to Kothari et al. (2009), management tends to withhold 
disclosure of downward adjustments in management forecasts and dividends 
and discloses the information only after the benefit to management of withholding 
no longer exceeds the cost.  They further demonstrate that this tendency is 
exacerbated by greater equity ownership and employment risk due to losses in 
personal wealth and reputation as a result of the expected negative market 
reaction to the bad news. 
Following agency theory and the findings from Kothari et al. (2009), 
management may be motivated to withhold the disclosure of material 
misstatements for at least two reasons.  The first is out of concern for wealth 
preservation.  Given the negative stock returns associated with disclosure of 
misstatements in prior period financials (Ettridge et al., 2010; Hennes et al., 
2008a; Palmrose et al. 2004; Anderson and Yohn, 2002), management with 
wealth tied to firm value (e.g. ownership, stock options) is likely to incur real 
wealth losses associated with a misstatement disclosure.  Concerned with wealth 
preservation, management may be motivated to withhold the disclosure to avoid 
the negative market reaction.  The second reason is out of concern for their 
reputation and continued employment.  Prior literature demonstrates that 
managers are held accountable for misstatements.  Specifically, shareholders of 
misstating firms question management credibility (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989) 
along with accounting practices and disclosure quality (GAO, 2002; Anderson 
and Yohn, 2002).  Managers of misstating firms also find that their reputation is 
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tarnished (Srinivasan, 2005) and their future employment is jeopardized (Ettridge 
et al., 2010; Hennes et al., 2008a; Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2010) following the 
disclosure.  Concerned over loss of reputation and employment, managers may 
be motivated to withhold the misstatement from the market. 
As Kothari et al. (2009) explains for manager’s withholding negative 
forecast adjustments, there is likely a cost/benefit decision for withholding 
misstatement disclosures where once the costs of withholding the information no 
longer exceeds the benefit to management the misstatement is disclosed.  Just 
where the shift in balance between benefits and costs occurs likely varies for 
each misstatement.  In some cases, management may withhold the disclosure 
long enough to lock in profits while the firm is overvalued which is consistent with 
Beneish (1999) findings of increased insider selling prior to misstatement 
disclosure.  In other cases management may withhold until the end of their term 
which would be consistent with studies such as Hennes et al. (2008a) that find 
increased senior management turnover following misstatement disclosure.  
Kothari et al. (2009) suggests that management withholds long enough to bury 
bad news with good news.  Consistent with Kothari et al. (2009), Myers et al. 
(2011) finds that management withholds misstatements long enough to disclose 
them obscurely in lengthy periodic reports.  History also demonstrates that 
scrutiny from regulators such as investigations can lead to misstatement 
disclosure (Palmrose et al., 2004; Hennes et al., 2008a).  
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2.3 Costs of strategic misstatement disclosure 
Prior literature has demonstrated that management’s decision to withhold 
bad news from the market can result in significant costs to the firm in the form of 
civil litigation and regulatory penalties.  Under Rule 10b-5 (10b-5), investors are 
able to seek redress for harm caused by relying on misstated financial 
statements provided they meet the requirements to establish a claim.  One such 
requirement is evidence of management’s intent to deceive the investor.  Where 
it can be demonstrated that management delayed the disclosure of the 
misrepresentation there is an increased likelihood of civil litigation (Skinner, 
1994; Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005).  The same literature also notes that the 
delay in disclosure increases the cost of litigation defense and settlement by 
increasing the litigation window and the number of investors harmed. 
Costs to the firm of management’s disclosure choice may also include 
increased regulatory attention.  Files (2011) demonstrates that less forthright 
misstatement disclosure results in an increased likelihood of SEC sanctions and 
increased monetary penalties for the firm.  To be more exact, for each week it 
takes management to disclose a material misstatement, the average firm incurs 
an additional $443,000 in corporate penalties (Files, 2011).      
2.4 Corporate governance and misstatement disclosure 
Management’s strategic disclosure behavior represents an agency cost to 
owners.  Where agency costs exist because management’s behavior diverges 
from owner preferences, shareholders can employ compensation incentives and 
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incur monitoring costs in an effort to align management’s behavior (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
While the influence of corporate governance on management disclosure 
practices is not a new subject, results from prior literature studying the influence 
of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure may not be generalizable to 
misstatement disclosures.  Daily et al. (2003) explain that the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance can vary between a firm in 
crisis and a firm not in crisis.  For example; the relationship between firm 
bankruptcy and institutional ownership depends on whether it is studied prior to 
the financial crisis, during the financial crisis, or following the financial crisis 
(Daily et al., 2003).  Firms that violate GAAP are often in crisis as evidenced by 
their poor performance, high leverage, and limited cash-flows from operations 
(Ettridge et al., 2010; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2010; Palmrose et al., 
2004; Richardson, Tuna, and Wu, 2002; Kinney and McDaniel, 1989).  This is the 
opposite of firms disclosing earnings forecasts which are often better performers 
(Lev and Penman, 1980; Miller, 2002).  The association between misstatement 
disclosure and the change in stock liquidity and cost of capital is consistent with a 
firm in crisis.  While management forecasts (i.e. voluntary disclosure) increase 
stock liquidity and reduce cost of capital (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005), misstatement disclosures result in the opposite and increase bid-
ask spread5 (Anderson and Yohn, 2002), decrease stock liquidity (Bardos, 2011), 
                                                          
5
 Bid-ask spreads are commonly used in the literature as a proxy for stock liquidity.  The greater 
the bid ask spread the less liquid the stock (Huberman and Halka, 2001; Chakravarty and Sarkar, 
1999). 
10 
 
and increase cost of capital (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hribar and Jenkins, 
2004; Kravet and Shevlin, 2010). 
2.5 Bundling effect  
Prior governance literature demonstrates the need to study alternate 
governance mechanisms (internal and external) simultaneously as the absence 
of a comprehensive design ignores the complementary and substitution effects 
(trade-offs) between the various governance mechanisms, commonly referred to 
as the bundling effect (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1994; 
Rediker and Seth, 1995; Laux and Laux, 2009; Cheng and Indjejikian, 2009). 
2.6 Internal governance mechanisms 
Owners have options for reigning in self-interested management.  They 
can offer incentives to better align management behavior and they can incur 
costs necessary to monitor management and limit their divergent behavior 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  What mix of each mechanism owners choose is 
beyond the scope of this study but has been shown to depend on both firm 
specific factors such as organizational complexity and firm risk (Beatty and Zajac, 
1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1994) and external factors such as the takeover, 
labor, and product markets (Cheng and Indjejikian, 2009). 
2.6.1 Incentive compensation 
Stock options and stock ownership link management’s personal wealth to 
shareholder wealth and provide management with incentives to take actions 
aligned with shareholder interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), though their use 
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can be a “double-edged sword” both motivating management to avoid taking 
actions that destroy firm value while at some point comprising enough of 
management compensation to incentivize risk-avoidance (Zajac and Westphal, 
1994).  While Kothari et al. (2009) finds that management’s tendency to withhold 
downward adjustments in management earnings forecasts is exacerbated by 
greater management ownership; the role of incentive mechanisms in influencing 
management’s misstatement disclosure choices has yet to be empirically 
investigated.  Greater compensation incentives, by design, likely sensitize 
management to the loss in firm value historically associated with misstatement 
disclosures and rather than encourage disclosure may instead discourage 
disclosure in an effort to preserve their personal wealth.  Although management 
may choose to withhold disclosure initially, at some point the benefit to 
management (e.g. wealth preservation) of withholding may no longer exceed the 
cost of withholding (e.g. regulatory sanctions and penalties) leading management 
to release the disclosure (Kothari et al., 2009).  Therefore, I expect that 
management with greater wealth tied to firm value through stock options and 
stock ownership will be less timely in their misstatement disclosures. 
2.6.2 Board monitoring 
While owners are concerned with management behaving in their best 
interests, portfolio diversification reduces the incentive for and efficiency of 
individual shareholder monitoring (Fama, 1980; Bhide, 1994).  Where ownership 
is not concentrated, boards are the most efficient means with which to hire, fire, 
compensate, and monitor management (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Since owners 
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incur monitoring costs for the purpose of aligning management behavior with 
their own interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), it follows that more effectively 
monitored management will be more timely in their misstatement disclosures.  
Prior literature demonstrates that greater board independence improves 
the effectiveness of board monitoring by reducing the influence of management 
on the board.  For example; insider dominated boards offer weaker monitoring as 
executives in effect self-monitor and may have significant influence over those 
responsible for monitoring (e.g. career advancement) (Beatty and Zajac, 1994) 
and board independence has been shown to have a positive association with 
board committee independence and a negative association with earnings 
management (Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Klein, 2002; Vafeas, 2005).  Since 
boards with greater independence better represent shareholder interests, I 
expect that firms with more independent boards will have more timely 
misstatement disclosure. 
Board size may also influence the boards monitoring effectiveness.  A 
greater number of directors can complicate coordination (Eisenberg, Sundgren, 
and Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996) and lengthen the board decision making 
process (Shaw, 1976; Smith et al., 1994) consistent with smaller boards offering 
more effective monitoring.  Given the demonstrated relationship between smaller 
boards and more effective monitoring, I expect that firms with smaller boards will 
have more timely misstatement disclosure. 
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2.6.3 Senior management dismissal 
Threat of dismissal is a valuable governance mechanism employed by the 
board (Walsh and Seward, 1990) and is the “ultimate sanction” used to influence 
management behavior (James and Soref, 1981; Weisbach, 1988; Huson, 
Parrino, and Starks, 2001).  Tasked with hiring and firing senior management 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983), it is the board’s responsibility to monitor and remove 
management who underperform or otherwise behave inconsistently with 
shareholder preferences (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989).  In the context of 
misstatements the board may choose to replace senior management that is 
either complicit in the misrepresentation or unwilling to properly disclose the 
misstatement.  Where outgoing management is terminated for poor performance, 
the incoming manager may credibly blame the outgoing manager for current 
problems and take measures to “clean the books” with little reputational costs to 
the incoming manager (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993).  In the case of 
misstatement disclosures, new managers will likely seek to disclose any 
misrepresentations that occurred during the prior management’s tenure.  If 
incoming management seeks to “clean the books,” I expect more timely 
misstatement disclosure as the result of senior management turnover.   
2.7 External governance mechanisms 
The corporate control market is a strong external governance mechanism 
that motivates management to maximize firm value under threat of takeover 
(Walsh and Seward, 1990).  While the market exists, management can take 
measures designed to circumvent the threat of takeover (Walsh and Seward, 
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1990; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009).  These 
anti-takeover measures serve to entrench management and further separate 
management from ownership.  A highly successful and often used anti-takeover 
measure is the staggered or classified board (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009).  The presence of a classified board decreases the 
attractiveness of takeovers to prospective acquirers by preventing the immediate 
transition of management.  With respect to misstatement disclosures, I expect 
that classified boards will shield management from threat of takeover allowing 
them to make disclosure decisions that are suboptimal to investors and reduce 
disclosure timeliness. 
Large shareholders, such as institutional owners, also serve as external 
monitors of management.  Institutional shareholders often own considerably 
more shares than individual investors (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Dharwadkar et 
al., 2008) making the cost of shirking their monitoring role much higher than that 
of more diffuse owners which serves as an incentive to “attend to the tasks of 
ownership” (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  Bushee and Noe (2000) demonstrate an 
association between higher institutional ownership and more forthcoming 
disclosure.  Contrary to the above theory, Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005) 
find that the private benefits and information generated from institutional 
ownership decrease the likelihood of voluntary disclosure.  Given the mixed 
results from prior literature, I do not have an expectation for the role of 
institutional ownership in influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness. 
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In investigating auditor specialization, Dunn and Mayhew (2004) provide 
evidence that audit quality plays a role in enhancing client disclosures.  The 
results imply that greater audit quality provides more effective monitoring of the 
firm’s financial reporting process.  Since the financial reporting process includes 
management’s disclosure decision, I expect that greater audit quality will 
influence management to comply with regulatory disclosure requirements and 
disclose misstatements in a timely manner. 
Finally, the firm’s securities litigation environment may also serve as an 
external governance mechanism.  Firms that face greater litigation risk, such as 
firms in industries prone to class action lawsuits, are more likely to issue 
voluntary disclosures (e.g. earnings warnings) (Skinner, 1994; Field et al., 2005).  
As a governance mechanism the threat of civil litigation may influence 
management’s misstatement disclosure behavior.  If greater litigation risk 
increases the cost to management of strategically disclosing misstatements, I 
expect that managers facing greater litigation risk will issue more timely 
misstatement disclosures. 
3. Sample Selection 
 
The sample begins with 582 accounting regularities identified by Hennes, 
Leone, and Miller (2008b) from the GAO Financial Restatement Database for the 
period 1997-2006.  I restrict the sample to accounting irregularities for two 
reasons.  First, the expected market reaction, threat of litigation, and turnover are 
all more severe for irregularities than for accounting errors (Palmrose et al., 
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2004; Hennes et al., 2008a).  The goal of this study is to determine if corporate 
governance influences management’s misstatement disclosure decisions and 
this influence is most likely to be seen where management has the greatest 
incentive to behave strategically.  In other words, I am more likely to find 
management taking actions to protect their personal wealth tied to firm value and 
protecting their employment and reputation where these things are most 
threatened.  Likewise, I am more likely to see the effects of board monitoring on 
disclosure timeliness where the divergence between management self-interest 
and investor interest is greatest.  Second, measuring timeliness as the number of 
days between the end of the misstatement period and the date of the 
misstatement disclosure is rather noisy.  Myers et al. (2011) explains that a 
limitation of the measure is that timeliness is jointly determined by how quickly 
management detects the misstatement and how quickly management discloses 
the misstatement.  By restricting the sample to accounting irregularities the 
measure is less likely to be impacted by the former as management is or should 
be aware of intentional misrepresentation (Hennes et al., 2008a). 
The sample was further restricted to those observations for which 
misstatement details were available from the Audit Analytics - Audit Non-
Reliance Database.  There were 103 observations that occurred between 1997 
and 1999 that were eliminated from the sample because the availability of non-
reliance data begins in 2000.  There were another 130 observations eliminated 
because there was no matching non-reliance data.  Out of the remaining 349 
observations 47 were missing required governance data.  Governance data was 
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hand collected from firm 10-K and DEF-14 (Proxy) submissions available through 
the SEC-EDGAR database.  Firm characteristics were collected from Compustat 
Fundamentals – Annual.  Any missing firm characteristics were hand collected 
from 10-K submissions.  Data necessary to calculate the magnitude of the 
earnings misstatement was collected from the Compustat Un-restated “As First 
Reported” Database.  Any missing un-restated information was hand collected 
from representative misstatement disclosures (e.g., press releases, 8-Ks, 10-Ks). 
The sample selection procedures are summarized more concisely in Table 
16 along with the sample distribution by year and industry.  The GAO dataset 
ends in June 2006 which explains the low number of observations for the final 
year of the sample.  Table 1 also introduces the timeliness measure, 
TIMELINESS, and provides the average number of days taken to disclose the 
sample’s accounting irregularities by year and industry.  There is no statistical 
difference between the mean TIMELINESS for each year and industry. 
 
{Insert Table 1: Sample selection and distribution} 
4. Methodology 
 
 I conduct a multivariate analysis of the association between misstatement 
disclosure timeliness (dependent variable) and both internal and external 
governance mechanisms (independent variables) controlling for misstatement 
                                                          
6
 Out of the 302 disclosure observations there are 16 firms with two disclosures and one firm with 
three disclosures.  The study’s conclusions are robust to the exclusion of firms with multiple 
disclosures. 
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severity and complexity (both likely to influence disclosure timeliness) and firm 
characteristics that have been shown in prior literature to influence 
management’s disclosure choices.  Since the dependent variable measures the 
duration of time between the end of the misstated period and the misstatement 
disclosure, the study utilizes a proportional hazard model (Cox Partial 
Likelihood)7 to estimate the parameters of the variables of interest.  Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (1999) explain that the proportional hazard model can be used when 
the purpose of the analysis is to determine the influence of covariates on 
duration.  The study’s sample consists of single observations for each 
misstatement and the duration to disclosure is known for each observation (i.e. 
all observations are failures).  In addition, all explanatory variables are measured 
once for each misstatement (i.e. time invariant).  Finally ties are resolved using 
Breslow (1974) approximations. 
 
 
(1) 
  
 
4.1 Dependent variable 
The number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the 
misstatement disclosure date has emerged as the accepted measure for the 
                                                          
7
 The study’s findings and conclusions are robust to using a simpler exponential model; 
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timeliness of misstatement disclosures (Files, 2011; Myers et al., 2011).  While 
the exact cause for the variation in disclosure timing is not known, it is likely to be 
associated with the quality of internal controls (detection), complexity of the 
accounting issue, and management’s disclosure timing decision.  By restricting 
the sample to accounting irregularities, I attempt to remove the noise associated 
with detection of accounting errors which can be difficult for management to 
detect even in firms with strong internal accounting processes.  Any noise due to 
detection that remains in the irregularity sample is likely to be negligible since 
accounting irregularities involve intentional misrepresentation which management 
either knew about or should have known about had they been diligent in their 
duties.  I further attempt to isolate managements timing decision by controlling for 
the complexity of the accounting issue involved in the misstatement.  Since 
timeliness is proxied by the number of days between the end of the misstatement 
period and the misstatement disclosure date, the greater the value of 
TIMELINESS, the less timely the disclosure. 
4.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables were hand collected from company proxy 
statements and periodic filings due to limited firm coverage from available 
governance datasets such as Execucomp and the Corporate Library.  The only 
exception is institutional ownership which was extracted from the CDA/Spectrum 
Thomson Financial services database.  Unless otherwise stated, the independent 
variables were measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the 
misstated period (i.e., the last period affected by the GAAP violation). 
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4.2.1 CEO Stock Options 
Meant to serve as a long term incentive for the maximization of firm value, 
significant stock option accumulation can have an incongruent effect on 
management behavior (Zajac and Westphal, 1994).  For instance, in periods of 
overvalued equity, management with significant in-the-money options are more 
likely to issue financial statements that violate GAAP in order to support the firm’s 
short-term stock price (Efendi et al., 2007).  I hand collect the value of both in-
the-money options that are exercisable and in-the-money options that are un-
exercisable from company periodic filings and proxy statements.  The two values 
are calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the 
market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the result by the number of 
shares at the given strike price and summing across contracts.  To control for 
heteroscedasticity in CEO sensitivity to the level of in-the-money stock options, I 
follow Efendi et al. (2007) and scale the value of the options by the CEO’s total 
pay (salary + bonus).  I include two stock option variables; one for IN-THE-
MONEY EXERCISABLE and one for IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE.  
Given the findings in Efendi et al. (2007), I expect that CEO’s with greater in-the-
money exercisable stock options will be more sensitive to the short-term stock 
price and will take longer to disclose misstatements.  Although un-exercisable 
options likely incentivize a longer horizon, their effect may be overshadowed by 
short term incentives (e.g. wealth preservation) from exercisable options.  For 
this reason, I do not have an expectation for how in-the-money un-exercisable 
options should influence disclosure timeliness.    
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4.2.3 CEO Ownership 
Within agency theory, CEO ownership serves to align management’s 
behavior with shareholder interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Subsequent 
literature has identified a tradeoff between low levels of ownership that serve to 
align CEO interests and greater levels of ownership that foster CEO 
entrenchment and suggest that the relationship between the level of CEO 
ownership and the alignment of interests is non-linear (Jensen and Warner, 
1988; McWilliam, 1990; Sundaramurthy, 1996).  These findings are consistent 
with the management disclosure literature demonstrating that lower levels of 
CEO ownership are associated with a greater likelihood of issuing management 
forecasts (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) and increased voluntary disclosure 
quality (Eng and Mak, 2003).  To control for this non-linearity in CEO ownership, I 
follow Sundaramurthy (1996) and include a variable for both the percentage of 
CEO ownership (CEO OWNERSHIP) and the percentage of CEO ownership 
squared (CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED).  CEO ownership is calculated as the 
number of shares owned by the CEO divided by the number of shares 
outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the 
misstated period.  Data necessary to calculate CEO ownership was hand 
collected from company periodic filings and proxy statements.  Given the non-
linear relationship between CEO ownership and the voluntary forecast disclosure 
exhibited in prior literature, I expect that CEO ownership will incentivize 
management to disclose misstatements in a more timely manner, though as 
ownership increases the timeliness of disclosure will decrease as the CEO’s 
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interests diverge from the owners.  In other words, I expect to see a curvilinear 
relationship between CEO ownership and misstatement disclosure timeliness 
similar to that demonstrated in the prior literature for voluntary disclosure.     
4.2.4 Board Independence 
Greater outside membership on the board of directors decreases insider 
influence and strengthens the board’s ability to effectively monitor management 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Beatty and Zajac, 1994).  I calculate BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE as the number of outside directors8 serving on the board, 
divided by the total number of directors.  Board information was hand collected 
from company periodic filings and proxy statements.  I expect that management 
monitored by boards with greater board independence will be more timely in their 
misstatement disclosures. 
4.2.5 Board Size 
The size of the firm’s board of directors can affect its ability to monitor 
management.  Small boards (less than 7 or 8 directors) are more likely to 
function effectively and are more difficult for the CEO to control (Jensen, 1993).  
BOARD SIZE is measured as the number of directors serving on the board and 
was hand collected from company periodic filings and proxy statements.  If 
smaller boards are more effective monitors, I expect that management monitored 
by smaller boards will disclose misstatements in a more timely manner. 
                                                          
8
 Directors who are not employees of the firm and who are not relatives of employees of the firm 
are classified as outside directors. 
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4.2.6 Senior management dismissal 
Should the board find it necessary, it has the ability to replace senior 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Since incoming management often use 
the earlier part of their tenure as an opportunity to “clean the books” and have the 
ability to blame discrepancies on outgoing management (Murphy and 
Zimmerman, 1993), I expect that replacing senior management should lead to 
more timely misstatement disclosure.  Given their joint responsibility for financial 
reporting, I include a variable for both CEO TURNOVER and CFO TURNOVER.  
I measure turnover as a change in the name of the executive in the year the 
misstatement period ends from that reported one year preceding the end of the 
misstated period.  CEO and CFO names are hand collected from company 
periodic filings and proxy statements. 
4.2.7 Classified boards 
A classified, or staggered, board is the quintessential takeover defense 
(Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk et al., 2009).  Whether included in the 
charter or by-law, classified boards prevent acquirers from replacing the entire 
board at one time by staggering director terms (usually over the period of three 
years), making the acquisition less attractive.  The concern for shareholders is 
that classified boards may entrench management, increasing agency costs by 
further driving a wedge between management and owners (Walsh and Seward, 
1990).  CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the board is 
classified and 0 otherwise.  I identify classified boards as having two or more 
classes of directors listed in their company periodic filings or proxy statements for 
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the year ending before the end of the misstated period.  Since a classified board 
further separates management for ownership, I expect that its presence reduces 
the cost to management of taking actions inconsistent with owner preferences 
and may result in less timely misstatement disclosure.    
4.2.8 Institutional ownership 
Evidence from the prior literature concerning the role of institutional 
ownership in aligning management disclosure practices with shareholder 
preferences is mixed.  While Bushee and Noe (2000) demonstrate an association 
between higher institutional ownership and more forthcoming disclosure, Ajinkya 
et al. (2005) finds that the private benefits and information generated from 
institutional ownership decrease the likelihood of voluntary disclosure.  Given the 
mixed results, I do not have an expectation for the role of institutional ownership 
in influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness.  I extract the number of 
outstanding shares held by institutional owners from the CDA/Spectrum 
Thomson Financial Services (13F filings) database.  I measure the percentage of 
institutional ownership at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstated 
period and calculate the variable, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, as the number 
of shares owned by institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding.   
4.2.9 Audit quality 
Dunn and Mayhew (2004) demonstrate that industry-specialist audit firms 
have a positive association with disclosure quality.  If this association is effected 
through greater auditing quality offered by specialization, audit quality in a more 
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general sense may influence management’s disclosure practices.  DeFond 
(1992) finds that name-brand is a good substitute for more complex measures of 
audit quality.  If audit quality is associated with greater monitoring of 
management’s disclosure practices, I expect that management subject to a 
higher quality auditor will disclose misstatements in a more timely manner.  I use 
Audit-Analytics to identify firms that have Big X auditors contracted at the end of 
the misstated period.  Following DeFond (1992), AUDIT QUALITY takes the 
value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated 
period and 0 otherwise. 
4.2.10 Litigation environment 
Management facing greater litigation risk is more likely to voluntarily 
disclose bad news (Skinner, 1994; Field et al., 2005).  I classify firms as 
operating within a highly litigious environment if their sector9 has an above 
average percentage of firms with new securities litigation filings from 2000-
2006.10  The frequency of new securities litigation filings is provided by the 
Stanford Securities Litigation Clearinghouse.  This process results in classifying 
the financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication services, 
and utilities sectors as highly litigious.  LITIGATION RISK is measured as an 
indicator variable and takes the value of 1 if the firm is a member of one of the 
five “high litigation” sectors and 0 otherwise. 
                                                          
9
 As identified under the Global Industry Classification System (GICS). 
10
 The period was chosen to coincide with the sample period. 
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4.3 Control variables 
Control variables that measure the characteristics of the given 
misstatement disclosure are measured at the time of the disclosure with the 
exception of the magnitude of the misstatement in income, which is measured 
after completion of the restatement.  Firm characteristics are measured at the 
end of the year preceding the end of the misstated period.  
4.3.1 Accounting issue 
Just as financial transactions vary in complexity, misstatements in 
transactions vary in complexity.  Sorting through a revenue recognition issue or 
merger issue may be more complex than sorting through a selling, general, and 
administrative (SG&A) expense issue.  I include a series of control variables to 
capture this variation in timeliness attributable to characteristics of the underlying 
accounting issue.  I include a control variable for REVENUE RECOGNITION 
ISSUE, LEASE ISSUE, INVENTORY ISSUE, MERGERS & ACQUISITION 
ISSUE, SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE, DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE, ACCRUALS 
ISSUE, and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE. 11  All accounting issues were 
measured as indicator variables and take the value of 1 if the misstatement 
involves the accounting issue and 0 otherwise.  It is possible for misstatements to 
involve more than one accounting issue.  Accounting issue data was extracted 
from the Audit Analytics – Non-reliance Database.     
                                                          
11
 Palmrose at al. (2004) introduce a continuous variable to account for the “pervasiveness” of the 
misstatement and is measured as the total number of accounting issues involved in the 
misstatement.  I use the same accounting issues but decompose the measure into individual 
dichotomous variables as I wish to capture changes in the intercept due to particular aspects of 
the individual accounting issues.  
27 
 
4.3.2 Misstatement duration 
The duration of misstated periods varies greatly between misstatement 
disclosures.  Since greater misstatement durations involve multiple periods, the 
probability of an outside party such as the SEC or auditor uncovering the 
misstatement is likely greater than a misstatement with a shorter duration.  The 
increased probability that an outside party may uncover the misstatement may 
factor into management’s decision to withhold the disclosure.  To control for this 
probability, I include a control variable for misstatement duration.  I follow 
Palmrose et al. (2004) and calculate MISSTATEMENT DURATION as the 
number of quarters misstated divided by 4.  Data necessary to calculate the 
misstatement duration was extracted from the Audit Analytics – Non-reliance 
Database.  
4.3.3 Magnitude of misstatement in income 
Consistent with the association of misstatement magnitude with 
misstatement severity (Palmrose et al., 2004) and misstatement disclosure 
timeliness (Myers et al., 2011) in the prior literature, I control for the magnitude of 
the misstatement of income.  I calculate the MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME as the 
cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-first-reported 
net income extracted from the Compustat Un-restated Database over the 
duration of the misstated period.  To control for heteroscedasticity, I scale the 
cumulative difference by firm assets measured one year prior to the end of the 
misstated period.    
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4.4.4 Post-SOX announcement 
SOX implementation has changed the landscape of misstatement 
disclosures (Scholz, 2008).  Misstatements disclosed post-SOX involve lower 
dollar amounts and are less likely to involve fraud and core income items (Burks, 
2011; Hennes et al., 2008; Scholz, 2008).  SOX holds management to a higher 
disclosure standard likely increasing the cost to management of withholding a 
misstatement disclosure.  I classify misstatement disclosures as a post-SOX 
announcement if the disclosure is released after August 29, 2002, the effective 
date of the SOX legislation (SOX, 2002).  POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs 
after August 29, 2002 and 0 otherwise. 
4.4.5 Post-Final-Rule 8-K announcement 
Final Rule 8-K became effective on August 23, 2004, and requires firms to 
disclose material misstatements within four days of determining that prior 
financials can no longer be relied upon by investors for decision making (SEC, 
2004).  The purpose of the regulation was to dissuade firms from making initial 
disclosure of the misstatements in periodic submissions and instead disclose in 
the more transparent, event-driven, Form 8-K.  Myers et al. (2011) finds that 
firms are more likely to disclose misstatements using the Form 8-K following the 
implementation of Final-Rule 8-K.  I classify misstatement disclosures as a post-
Final-Rule 8-K announcement if the disclosure is released after August 23, 2004.  
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes 
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the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 23, 2004 and 0 
otherwise. 
4.4.6 Firm size 
I include a variable for firm size to control for the known association 
between larger firms and higher voluntary disclosure quality (Eng and Mak, 
2003).  FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s book value 
of total assets one year prior to the end of the misstated period.  Asset data was 
extracted from Compustat – Annual12. 
4.4.7 Firm leverage 
Eng and Mak (2003) further find that firms with lower debt have higher 
voluntary disclosure quality so I include a variable for firm leverage to control for 
the impact of debt on management decisions across debt levels (Ettridge et al., 
2010; Palmrose et al., 2004; Richardson et al., 2002; Kinney and McDaniel, 
1989).  FIRM LEVERAGE was calculated by dividing the firm’s book value of 
long-term debt by the firm’s book value of total assets both measured one year 
prior to the end of the misstated period.  Debt and asset data was extracted from 
Compustat – Annual. 
                                                          
12
 Misstatement disclosure fiscal year may differ from the calendar year of the disclosure.  For this 
reason, the announcements in this study are aligned with their fiscal year before matching with 
Compustat firm data. Approximately one-fifth of the restatements in the sample required 
alignment before merging with control data. 
30 
 
4.4.8 Temporal and industry effects 
I control for industry13 and year fixed effects to capture shifts in the 
timeliness of misstatement disclosures over time and industry disclosure 
practices. 
4.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics on the variables measuring 
disclosure timeliness, corporate governance, misstatement characteristics, and 
firm characteristics.  On average, accounting irregularities in the sample took 170 
days to disclose, overstated net income by 4.1% of assets, and impacted 2.5 
years of financials.  The time elapsed before disclosure is consistent at the mean 
and median with summary statistics in both Files (2011) and Myers et al. (2011).  
Out of the 302 observations, 49% involved revenue recognition, 11% involved 
leases, 21% involved inventory, 13% involved mergers and acquisition, 23% 
involved selling, general, and administrative expenses, 12% involved deferred 
taxes, 30% involved accruals, and 3% involved intangible assets.  Consistent 
with irregularities being more pervasive (Palmrose et al., 2004) and involving 
earnings manipulation (Ettridge et al., 2010; Hennes et al., 2008; Richardson et 
al., 2002; Beneish, 1999), 48% of the misstatements involve multiple accounting 
issues and 71% involve revenue recognition, inventory, and/or accruals. 
The average misstating CEO owns 7% of the firm’s outstanding stock and 
has over 4 times (2 times) their total salary in value from in-the-money 
exercisable stock options (in-the-money un-exercisable stock options).  The 
                                                          
13
 I use the same industry classification utilized in Song and Walkling (1993). 
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average board has 8 directors and 78% on average are outsiders.  Over 26% of 
the CEOs and 40% of the CFOs were replaced in the year prior to the end of the 
misstated period.  A large number of the firms (54%) have classified boards and 
over 86% have a Big X auditor at the end of the misstated period.  The mean 
institutional ownership is 43% and over 58% of the firms operate in a highly 
litigious sector.   
Finally, the sample’s mean firm size is $685M (unreported) and firm 
leverage is 22%.  The mean firm size is greater than that for the Compustat 
universe over the same period, which is consistent with Ettridge et al.’s (2010) 
findings that fraud firms tend to be larger in size.  The mean leverage is also 
greater, which is consistent with prior literature finding a positive association 
between misstatements and financial distress (Ettridge et al., 2010; Palmrose et 
al., 2004; Richardson et al., 2002; Kinney and McDaniel, 1989).   
 
{Insert Table 2: Descriptive statistics} 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Univariate 
Table 3 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients for the pairings 
between misstatement disclosure TIMELINESS and the study’s governance and 
control measures.  Three of the internal governance measures demonstrate a 
significant univariate association with misstatement disclosure timeliness in the 
expected direction and none of the external governance measures demonstrate 
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significant univariate association with misstatement disclosure timeliness.  
Consistent with the expectation that CEO’s with greater in-the-money exercisable 
stock options will be more sensitive to the short-term stock price and will take 
longer to disclose misstatements, IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE has a 
significant positive correlation with TIMELINESS.  Consistent with the 
expectation that management monitored by boards with greater board 
independence will be more timely in their misstatement disclosures, BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE has a significant negative correlation with TIMELINESS.  
Finally, consistent with the expectation that incoming senior management looking 
to “clean the books” should lead to more timely misstatement disclosure, CFO 
TURNOVER has a significant negative association with TIMELINESS. 
 
{Insert Table 3: Pearson correlation matrices} 
 
Table 3 does not demonstrate a significant correlation between CEO 
OWNERSHIP and TIMELINESS.  To determine if this lack of correlation is 
consistent with prior literature’s suggestion that CEO ownership has a non-linear 
relation with incentive alignment between the CEO and shareholders (Jensen 
and Warner, 1988; McWilliam, 1990; Sundaramurthy, 1996), I look at 
TIMELINESS over six stratifications of CEO ownership; starting with five even 
quintiles and creating a sixth stratification by segregating from the first quintile 
those CEOs with no (zero) ownership in the firm.  The sixth stratification is 
important for exposition because prior literature leads me to expect a distinct 
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difference between no ownership (no alignment) and an epsilon of ownership 
(some alignment) (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Eng and Mak, 2003). 
Table 4 demonstrates the non-linear relationship between CEO 
OWNERSHIP and TIMELINESS.  The switch from a monotonic decrease in 
TIMELINESS starting with zero CEO ownership to a monotonic increase 
beginning in the third quintile is consistent with a curvilinear relationship between 
CEO ownership and misstatement disclosure timeliness.  The univariate 
evidence is consistent with extant literature identifying a shift between low levels 
of ownership that serve to align CEO interests and greater levels of ownership 
that foster CEO entrenchment suggesting that the relationship between the level 
of CEO ownership and alignment of interests is non-linear (Jensen and Warner, 
1988; McWilliam, 1990; Sundaramurthy, 1996).    
 
{Insert Table 4: CEO ownership and misstatement disclosure timeliness} 
5.2 Multivariate 
Table 5 presents the results of the proportional hazard model.  The table 
includes six models.  All of the models include cluster adjusted standard errors 
for industry heteroscedasticity and the final model includes dummies for year and 
industry.  Negative coefficients from the hazard model are interpreted as a 
decrease in the rate of a failure (disclosure) occurring in time t conditional on the 
failure not occurring in time t-1.  Therefore a negative coefficient is interpreted as 
contributing to less timely disclosure.  
34 
 
Model 1 includes the management incentive compensation measures (one 
of two sub-sets of the internal governance mechanisms).  The measure for the 
CEO’s sensitivity to changes in firm value, IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE, is 
significant and negative, consistent with greater value from in-the-money 
exercisable stock options incentivizing management to disclose misstatements in 
a less timely manner.  The second stock option measure, IN-THE-MONEY UN-
EXERCISABLE, is not significant.  I did not have an expectation for the second 
measure since un-exercisable options likely incentivize a longer horizon, a 
horizon that may be over-shadowed by short term incentives (e.g. wealth 
preservation) from exercisable options.  I included two variables to represent 
CEO ownership and capture the expected non-linear relationship.  The first, CEO 
OWNERSHIP is significant and in the positive direction consistent with CEO 
ownership incentivizing management to disclose misstatements in a timely 
manner.  The second, CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED is significant and negative.  
The significant positive coefficient for CEO OWNERSHIP and the significant 
negative coefficient for CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED are consistent with a non-
linear relationship between CEO ownership and disclosure timeliness where low 
levels of CEO ownership incentivize more timely disclosure but at a certain 
threshold of ownership the CEO becomes incentivized to disclose in a less timely 
manner. 
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Model 2 includes the board monitoring measures (the second sub-set of 
the internal governance mechanisms).14  The measure of the board’s 
independence from senior management influence, BOARD INDEPENDENCE, is 
significant and positive, consistent with more effective monitoring of management 
leading to better alignment with shareholder interests and more timely 
misstatement disclosure.  BOARD SIZE, the study’s measure for the board’s 
decision efficiency, is not significant in the reduced model.  Out of the two 
measures for the board’s use of senior management dismissal as a monitoring 
mechanism, CEO TURNOVER is not significant and CFO TURNOVER is 
significant and positive.  Morck et al. (1989) notes that it is generally more difficult 
for the board to replace the CEO as opposed to replacing other senior 
management.  The study may lack significance for the CEO TURNOVER 
measure because of this increased difficulty.  The significant positive result for 
CFO TURNOVER is consistent with incoming CFOs “cleaning the books” and in 
the process improving the timeliness of the misstatement disclosure.15 
Model 3 includes the external governance measures.  The significant 
negative coefficient for CLASSIFIED BOARD is consistent with the anti-takeover 
defense entrenching management and reducing disclosure timeliness.  Given the 
mixed findings in prior literature on the influence of institutional investors on firm 
disclosure, I did not have an expectation for the study’s measure of institutional 
                                                          
14
 Inclusion of a variable for board meeting frequency [un-tabulated] results in a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient consistent with greater board involvement generating more 
timely disclosure.  The study’s primary results are robust to this additional inclusion.  
15
 The study’s results are robust to controlling for the simultaneous turnover of both the CEO and 
CFO in the year prior to the end of the misstated period.  The results for inclusion of an 
interaction term [un-tabulated] are significant and positive equating to misstatement disclosure 
occurring over two times faster than disclosures without prior turnover. 
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monitoring, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, the results for which are 
insignificant.  Although the coefficient sign is in the expected direction for AUDIT 
QUALITY, the result is not significant.  The study’s measure for the firm’s 
securities ligation environment, LITIGATION RISK, is significant and positive, 
consistent with greater litigation risk increasing the cost to management of 
withholding disclosure and therefore incentivizing more timely misstatement 
disclosure. 
Model 4 includes the misstatement and firm characteristic control 
measures.  It is interesting to note that disclosure timeliness depends in part on 
the accounting issue involved in the misstatement.  The coefficient for 
MERGERS AND ACQUISTION ISSUE and DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE are 
significantly negative based on a two tailed test, suggesting that misstatements 
involving mergers and acquisitions or deferred taxes may be more complex or 
have other characteristics that require a longer period before disclosure.  The 
coefficient for LEASE ISSUE is significantly positive based on a two-tailed test, 
suggesting that lease issues may be considered less harmful to management, 
and therefore, require less time to disclose.  The results for both of the study’s 
measures for misstatement severity are statistically significant.  First, 
MISSTATEMENT DURATION is significantly positive consistent with longer 
lasting irregularities being disclosed in a more timely manner.  Second, 
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is significantly negative suggesting that more 
severe overstatements in income are disclosed in a more timely manner.  The 
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result for MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is consistent with findings from Myers et 
al. (2011) that demonstrate more timely disclosure for income overstatements. 
Model 5 includes all of the internal and external governance measures 
and the misstatement and firm characteristic measures.  A comprehensive 
design that simultaneously considers the internal and external governance 
mechanisms acknowledges the complimentary and substitution effects between 
mechanisms as demonstrated in prior literature (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Zajac 
and Westphal, 1994; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Laux and Laux, 2009; Cheng and 
Indjejikian, 2009).  The governance mechanisms and controls maintain the signs 
on coefficients and significance levels are consistent with those reported for 
Models 1 through 4.  When considering the mechanisms simultaneously, the 
study’s measure for board decision efficiency, BOARD SIZE, becomes significant 
maintaining its negative coefficient from Model 2.  The result for BOARD SIZE 
provides evidence that smaller boards known for more efficient decisions 
(Jensen, 1993) are more effective at aligning management’s behavior with 
shareholder preference, resulting in more timely misstatement disclosure.  
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE which has a negative and significant 
coefficient in Model 5 suggests that there are certain characteristics (e.g. 
complexity or severity) of revenue misstatements that lead to less timely 
disclosure.  FIRM SIZE also becomes significant in Model 5 with a positive 
coefficient consistent with prior literature finding greater disclosure quality for 
larger firms (Eng and Mak, 2003).     
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Model 616 includes the internal and external governance measures, the 
misstatement and firm characteristic measures, and indicator variables to capture 
year and industry fixed effects.  Because POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT and 
POST-FINAL-RULE-8-K ANNOUNCEMENT are measured based on time and 
over 74% of the disclosures in the sample are announced post-SOX, both 
measures are highly collinear with the indicator variables for the year dummies 
and are removed from Model 6.17  The internal and external governance 
measures from Models 1 through 5 maintain their significance in Model 6 and 
demonstrate stable coefficients.  The results for the controls also remain 
consistent with Models 1 through 5 with the exception of SG&A EXPENSES 
ISSUE which has a significant positive coefficient in Model 6 suggesting that 
management finds misstatements involving SG&A expenses less threating or 
less complex leading to more timely disclosure.18 
 
{Insert Table 5: Misstatement disclosure timeliness: Proportional hazard model} 
                                                          
16
 The study’s results are robust to inclusion of controls for management’s choice of disclosure 
venue (e.g. Press Release, Form 8-K, Form 10-K/Q) [un-tabulated].  The coefficients for the 
venue controls are consistent with expectations established by Myers et al., (2011) with press 
releases being the most timely followed by Form 8-K submissions, then Form 10-K/Q 
submissions though the resulting coefficients are not statistically significant. 
17
 Inclusion of POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT and POST-FINAL-RULE-8-K ANNOUNCEMENT 
in Model 6 despite the collinearity does not alter any of the conclusions drawn from Model 6 as 
tabulated though it does make interpretation of the two announcement variables cumbersome 
and does not change their overall significance from Table 5.   
18
 Partitioning the sample into accelerated (148 observations) and non-accelerated (154 
observations) filers reveals interesting results.  While management’s sensitivity to changes in the 
short-term stock price (stock options and ownership) is positively associated with the time 
elapsed before disclosure for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers, the proxies for 
monitoring effectiveness are only statistically significant for the non-accelerated filers [un-
tabulated]. 
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5.3 Limitations 
 The study’s results are limited in their generalizability to the greater 
misstatement population.  The fact that accounting errors are rather innocuous 
when compared to accounting irregularities as evidenced by the greater negative 
stock returns around firm’s disclosing the latter (Hennes et al., 2008a), leads me 
to believe that management may have less motivation (e.g. wealth preservation) 
to behave strategically when it comes to disclosing accounting errors. 
6. Additional Analysis 
6.1 Misstatement disclosure transparency and corporate governance 
The purpose of this section is to determine if disclosure transparency, 
another misstatement disclosure choice, is influenced by compensation 
incentives, board monitoring, and external governance in a manner similar to 
those demonstrated for disclosure timeliness.  Since investor’s likely prefer more 
transparent information over less transparent, my expectations for the 
relationships between the various internal and external governance mechanisms 
and transparency are the same as those for the main study. 
Table 6 presents the results of a multivariate logit regression with 
disclosure in Form 8-K as the dependent variable and the independent and 
control variables from the main study.  The sub-sample for Table 6 includes only 
those misstatements that are disclosed in a Form 8-K or a periodic filing such as 
a 10-K or 10-Q.  The sub-sample is partitioned into a pre Final-Rule 8-K and a 
post Final Rule 8-K since the regulation added financial misstatements as a 
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reportable event and compliance likely increased the cost to management of 
choosing to disclose in a periodic filing versus the Form 8-K.  This design is 
consistent with Myer’s et al. (2011) finding that firms are more likely to disclose 
misstatements transparently in the Form 8-K than obscurely in a periodic filing 
such as a 10-K or 10-Q post Final-Rule 8-K. 
Table 6 includes three models, the first model, Model 1, includes the entire 
sub-sample of disclosures in 8-Ks, 10-Qs, or 10-Ks.  Models 2 and 3 partition the 
sub-sample into pre-Final-Rule 8-K and post-Final Rule 8-K. 
The results for the transparency model are largely insignificant and fail to 
support the majority of the expected relationships with the exception of IN-THE-
MONEY EXERCISABLE which is significant and negative consistent with wealth 
preservation incentivizing less transparent misstatement disclosure. 
 
{Insert Table 6: Misstatement disclosure transparency and governance} 
6.2 Accounting error disclosure timeliness 
Hennes et al. (2008a) demonstrates a significant difference in the stock 
returns to disclosures of accounting irregularities versus stock returns to 
accounting errors.  They find a more negative return on average for irregularity 
disclosures (-14%) than error disclosures (-2%).  I restricted my sample to 
accounting irregularities recognizing that this greater destruction in firm value 
may motivate managers to behave more strategically since the market reaction 
to accounting errors is less severe.  In other words, I am more likely to find 
management taking actions to protect their personal wealth tied to firm value and 
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protecting their employment and reputation where these things are most 
threatened.  This holds for board monitoring as well.  I am more likely to see the 
effects of board monitoring on disclosure timeliness where the divergence 
between management self-interest and investor interest is greatest. 
While including accounting errors in the study’s main model and 
conditioning on irregularity is an alternate methodology to the one used, hand 
collecting the governance data would be very costly and would offer little benefit 
should managers prove less concerned about the market’s reaction to an error.  
Another option is to extract the governance data from available governance 
datasets such as Execucomp, but limited data availability significantly reduces 
the sample size and biases the sample toward larger firms (e.g., S&P 1500). 
Rather than combine irregularity observations that have hand collected 
governance data with error observations that have dataset extracted governance 
data, I chose to limit the study’s main sample to accounting irregularities and 
save the error sample for additional analysis. 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for the accounting error sample.  
The sample begins with 2,121 observations from the GAO Financial Restatement 
Database classified as accounting errors by Hennes et al. (2008b).  Due to data 
availability restrictions only 1,095 observations were matched with their 
respective misstatement characteristics.  Panel B highlights the difficulty in using 
available governance databases such as Execucomp and Corporate Library to 
extract data necessary for the internal and external governance measures.  
Since the number of observations with matching CEO ownership data was less 
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than 1%, CEO ownership is not considered in the multivariate analysis that 
follows. 
{Insert Table 7: Accounting error sample} 
Table 8 presents the results of the proportional hazard model and includes 
seven variations.  Models 7 includes indicator variables to control for year and 
industry fixed effects and does not include POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT and 
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K announcement following the same rationale given for 
Table 5.  Model 1 and 2 both demonstrate a significant positive coefficient for 
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K, consistent with improved timeliness following 
implementation of the regulation.  The significant positive coefficients for 
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP and LITIGATION RISK in Model 2 are consistent 
with greater institutional ownership and high litigation risk resulting in more timely 
disclosure of accounting errors.  Model 3 includes CLASSIFIED BOARD without 
significant results.  Because of the number of observations missing data on 
board classification, CLASSIFIED BOARD is not included in Model 6 or 7.  The 
results of Models 4 through 7 consistently demonstrate a significant positive 
coefficient for IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE, opposite the expectation, and in 
clear contrast to the findings for accounting irregularities.  This result appears to 
be consistent with management having greater incentive to withhold the more 
severe accounting irregularity disclosures.  Model 7 further demonstrates a 
significant positive coefficient for BOARD INDEPENDENCE and AUDIT 
QUALITY, consistent with greater independence and higher quality audits 
improving disclosure timeliness for accounting errors.  Finally, the coefficient for 
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MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is consistently negative and significant in Models 
3 through 7 consistent with more timely disclosure of accounting errors resulting 
in large income overstatements.  
 
{Insert Table 8: Error disclosure timeliness: Proportional hazard model} 
7. Conclusions 
 
This study uses variation in the time elapsed between the last financials 
misstated and management’s initial misstatement disclosure to measure the 
relationship between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms 
and misstatement disclosure timeliness.  Gaining an understanding of the 
relationship between the two is important.  Prior literature on the relationship 
between governance and voluntary disclosures has limited generalizability to the 
misstatement disclosure setting as firms in crisis may demonstrate different 
corporate governance relationships compared to firms not in crisis. 
Using a proportional hazard model inclusive of both internal and external 
governance mechanisms and a sample of 302 accounting irregularities disclosed 
between 2000 and 2006, I present empirical evidence of corporate governance 
influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness.  Specifically, I present evidence 
consistent with the value of in-the-money stock options incentivizing 
management to disclose misstatements in a less timely manner19 and a non-
                                                          
19
 One standard deviation change from the mean IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE results in a 
10% change in the rate of disclosure. 
44 
 
linear relationship between management ownership and timeliness where the 
evidence is consistent with low levels of ownership improving timeliness and high 
levels of ownership reducing timeliness20.  I also find evidence consistent with 
greater board independence21, CFO turnover22 prior to the end of the misstated 
period, and the firm’s litigation environment23 contributing to more timely 
misstatement disclosure and greater board size24 and board classification25 
resulting in less timely misstatement disclosure. 
  
                                                          
20
 A one standard deviation increase in CEO ownership from 0.0% (the 25
th
 percentile) results in 
a 57% increase in the rate of disclosure, a one standard deviation increase in CEO ownership 
from 5.4% (the 75
th
 percentile) results in a 42% increase in the rate of disclosure, and a one 
standard deviation increase in CEO ownership from 32.2% (the 95
th
 percentile) results in a 15% 
decrease in the rate of disclosure. 
21
 One standard deviation change from the mean BOARD INDEPENDENCE results in a 28% 
change in the rate of disclosure. 
22
 CFO turnover prior to the end of the misstated period results in a 32% increase in the rate of 
disclosure. 
23
 Operating in a highly litigious sector results in a 33% increase in the rate of disclosure. 
24
 One standard deviation change from the mean BOARD SIZE results in a 14% change in the 
rate of disclosure. 
25
 A classified board results in a 15% decrease in the rate of disclosure. 
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Figure 1 Misstatement disclosure timeliness (2000-2006) 
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Notes: 
a) Data for the figure is limited to accounting errors and irregularities identified in the GAO Financial 
Restatement Database for which an end-date for the misstatement period is identified in Audit Analytics. 
b) The data for CY2006 does not reflect a full year as the GAO Dataset ends June 2006. 
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Table 1
Sample selection and distribution by year and industry
Panel A: Sample selection
Mean # of Days
to Disclose
[TIMELINESS ]
Accounting irregularities (initial sample) 582
Less missing misstatement data 233
Less missing governance data 47
Final sample 302 170
Panel B: Distribution by year # Observations
Percent of
Sample
Mean # of Days
to Disclose
[TIMELINESS ]
2000 17 5.6% 150
2001 25 8.3% 195
2002 55 18.2% 170
2003 33 10.9% 165
2004 53 17.5% 164
2005 82 27.2% 164
2006 37 12.3% 189
Panel C: Distribution by industry # Observations
Percent of
Sample
Mean # of Days
to Disclose
[TIMELINESS ]
Chemicals 21 7.0% 179
Communication, Gas, Electric, and Sanitation 33 10.9% 170
Construction 4 1.3% 212
Financial 41 13.6% 166
Food and Tobacco 6 2.0% 179
Hotels, Motels, and Tourism 1 0.3% 109
Leather, Stone 1 0.3% 217
Lumber, Furniture, Paper, and Print 5 1.7% 186
Machinery 37 12.3% 149
Measuring Instruments 14 4.6% 150
Mining 7 2.3% 130
Petroleum and Rubber 4 1.3% 231
Primary and Fabricated Metals 5 1.7% 187
Retail Trade 22 7.3% 178
Services 71 23.5% 178
Textiles and Apparel 6 2.0% 183
Transportation 8 2.6% 202
Wholesale Trade 11 3.6% 151
Miscellaneous 5 1.7% 140
Panel A outlines the sample selection beginning with the 582 accounting irregularities identified by HLM in 
their online dataset.  The final sample consists of 302 accounting irregularity observations  after eliminating 
233 observations for missing misstatement data and 47 for missing governance data necessary to measure 
variables used in the study.  Panel B provides the sample distribution by year and the mean value of the 
study's primary dependent variable, TIMELINESS, for each year.  There is no statistical difference between 
the mean number of days to disclosure and the sample mean for any of the years. Panel C provides the 
sample distribution by industry and the mean value of the study's primary dependent variable, TIMELINESS, 
for each industry.  There is no statistical difference between the mean number of days to disclosure and the 
sample mean for any of the industries.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
n Mean Standard Deviation 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
TIMELINESS 302 170.16 100.67 115.00 144.00 205.00
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE 302 4.21 12.59 0.00 0.38 2.77
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE 302 2.06 6.93 0.00 0.11 1.41
CEO OWNERSHIP 302 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.05
BOARD INDEPENDENCE 302 0.78 0.13 0.71 0.82 0.88
BOARD SIZE 302 8.25 2.64 6.00 8.00 10.00
CEO TURNOVER 302 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00
CFO TURNOVER 302 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
CLASSIFIED BOARD 302 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 302 0.43 0.38 0.00 0.44 0.82
AUDIT QUALITY 302 0.86 0.35 1.00 1.00 1.00
LITIGATION RISK 302 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE 302 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
LEASE ISSUE 302 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00
INVENTORY ISSUE 302 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE 302 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE 302 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE 302 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
ACCRUALS ISSUE 302 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE 302 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
MISSTATEMENT DURATION 302 2.57 1.69 1.25 2.25 3.50
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME 302 -0.041 0.199 -0.019 -0.004 0.000
POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT 302 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT 302 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
FIRM SIZE [ln(total assets)] 302 6.53 2.30 4.81 6.48 7.97
FIRM LEVERAGE 302 0.22 0.22 0.02 0.18 0.34
Table 2 describes the dependent, independent, and control variables used in the study to examine the influence of internal  and external governance on the timeliness of 
misstatement disclosures.  The mean and median TIMELINESS is consistent with summary statistics in both Files (2011) and Myers et al. (2011).  Continuous 
variables (with the exception of the dependent variable) are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent to mitigate the influence of outliers.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the misstatement disclosure date; IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE
measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the misstatement end date and is calculated by taking the 
difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO 
total pay (salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money un-exercisable stock options at the end of the year 
preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and 
multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); CEO OWNERSHIP measures the CEO's stockholdings in the 
misstating firm at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by dividing the number of shares owned by the CEO by the 
number of shares outstanding; BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the number of outside directors by the total number of directors both measured at 
the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors serving on the board measured at the end of the year 
preceding the end of the misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced in the year prior to the end 
of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CFO was replaced in the year prior to the end of 
the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board has two or more classes of directors at 
the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is calculated by dividing the number of shares  
held by institutional owners by the number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; AUDIT 
QUALITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated period and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION 
RISK is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication 
services, or utilities) at the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold and 0 otherwise; MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A 
EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to selling, general, or 
administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the 
misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the 
misstatement was related to accruals and 0 otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue 
involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT DURATION is the number of misstated quarters divided by 4; 
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-first-reported net income over the 
misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002 
and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 
23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets one year prior to the end of the misstated period; FIRM 
LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total assets both measured one year prior to the end of the misstated period.
48
Table 3
Pearson correlation matrices
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
TIMELINESS (1) 1.00
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE (2) 0.12 1.00
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE (3) 0.01 0.33 1.00
CEO OWNERSHIP (4) 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 1.00
BOARD INDEPENDENCE (5) -0.09 0.00 0.08 -0.41 1.00
BOARD SIZE (6) 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.24 0.32 1.00
CEO TURNOVER (7) -0.09 -0.03 0.15 -0.16 0.07 0.08 1.00
CFO TURNOVER (8) -0.11 -0.03 0.12 -0.08 0.06 0.00 0.33 1.00
CLASSIFIED BOARD (9) 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.14 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.01 1.00
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP (10) -0.01 0.10 0.03 -0.25 0.16 0.17 -0.05 -0.10 0.11 1.00
AUDIT QUALITY (11) 0.00 0.06 0.07 -0.28 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.04 0.18 0.28 1.00
LITIGATION RISK (12) -0.09 0.14 0.10 -0.08 0.11 -0.07 0.09 -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04 1.00
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE (13) 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.07 -0.11 0.15 0.14 0.10 -0.09 0.04 0.16 1.00
LEASE ISSUE (14) -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.20 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.17 0.09 0.00 -0.14 1.00
INVENTORY ISSUE (15) -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.14 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.19 0.07 -0.03 1.00
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE (16) 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.04 1.00
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE (17) -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.10 -0.17 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 1.00
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE (18) 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.13 -0.17 0.03 -0.14 0.00 0.06 1.00
ACCRUALS ISSUE (19) 0.01 0.04 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.10 -0.04 0.04 0.15 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 1.00
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE (20) 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 1.00
MISSTATEMENT DURATION (21) -0.13 0.00 -0.07 -0.16 0.09 0.16 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.18 0.14 -0.02 -0.06 0.12 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.14 0.04 0.04 1.00
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME (22) 0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.08 0.29 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.22 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.03 1.00
POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT (23) 0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.19 -0.13 0.06 0.04 0.14 -0.10 -0.01 -0.18 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.21 -0.03 1.00
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT (24) -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.11 0.04 0.00 0.11 -0.22 0.02 -0.06 0.18 -0.07 -0.10 -0.18 0.12 -0.02 0.06 0.19 0.02 0.52 1.00
FIRM SIZE (25) -0.07 0.05 0.00 -0.33 0.32 0.69 0.09 -0.02 0.05 0.22 0.45 0.00 -0.08 0.17 -0.08 0.07 -0.09 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.28 0.19 0.05 -0.02 1.00
FIRM LEVERAGE 0.00 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.26 0.02 0.00 -0.09 0.09 0.12 -0.21 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.03 -0.12 -0.12 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.28
Table 3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the study's dependent, independent, and control variables used in the study to examine the influence of internal  and external governance on the timeliness of misstatement disclosure.
Continuous variables are  winsorized at the top and bottom one percent to mitigate the influence of outliers.  Significant correlations at the 10% level or better are bolded.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the misstatement disclosure date; IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of 
the year preceding the misstatement end date and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay
(salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money un-exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between 
the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); CEO OWNERSHIP measures the CEO's stockholdings in the misstating firm 
at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by dividing the number of shares owned by the CEO by the number of shares outstanding; BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the number of outside 
directors by the total number of directors both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors serving on the board measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the 
misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
if the CFO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board has two or more classes of directors at the end of the year preceding the 
end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is calculated by dividing the number of shares  held by institutional owners by the number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end 
of the misstatement period; AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated period and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION RISK is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication services, or utilities) at the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the 
misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold and 0 
otherwise; MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to selling, general, or administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to accruals and 0 
otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT DURATION is the number of 
misstated quarters divided by 4; MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-first-reported net income over the misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002 and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs 
after August 23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets one year prior to the end of the misstated period; FIRM LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total 
assets both measured one year prior to the end of the misstated period.
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Table 4
CEO ownership and misstatement disclosure timeliness
n
Min Mean Max Mean Median
CEO OWNERSHIP: Zero 8 0.000 0.000 0.000 220 169
CEO OWNERSHIP: First Quintile 53 0.000 0.001 0.003 175 140
CEO OWNERSHIP: Second Quintile 60 0.004 0.008 0.014 158 132
CEO OWNERSHIP: Third Quintile 61 0.014 0.020 0.029 164 139
CEO OWNERSHIP: Fourth Quintile 60 0.029 0.046 0.074 170 154
CEO OWNERSHIP: Fifth Quintile 60 0.075 0.252 0.626 177 156
TIMELINESS
CEO
OWNERSHIP
Table 4 demonstrates the non-linear relationship between CEO ownership and misstatement disclosure 
timeliness.  The higher the value of TIMELINESS the less timely the misstatement disclosure.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the 
misstatement disclosure date; CEO OWNERSHIP measures the CEO's stockholdings in the misstating 
firm at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by dividing the 
number of shares owned by the CEO by the number of shares outstanding. 
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Table 5
Misstatement disclosure timeliness: Irregularity sample - Proportional Hazard Model (Cox Partial Likelihood)
Independent Variables E Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat.
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE (-) -0.01 0.99 -6.19 *** -0.01 0.99 -2.30 ** -0.01 0.99 -2.33 ***
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.31
CEO OWNERSHIP (+) 1.82 6.17 1.79 ** 3.53 34.19 2.07 ** 4.60 99.34 2.07 **
CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED (-) -4.06 0.02 -1.99 ** -5.90 0.00 -1.89 ** -7.60 0.00 -1.90 **
BOARD INDEPENDENCE (+) 0.62 1.87 1.48 * 1.07 2.92 2.19 ** 1.88 6.57 2.67 ***
BOARD SIZE (-) -0.01 0.99 -0.19 -0.06 0.94 -1.73 ** -0.06 0.95 -1.89 **
CEO TURNOVER (+) 0.11 1.12 0.71 0.15 1.16 0.99 0.06 1.06 0.31
CFO TURNOVER (+) 0.22 1.24 1.57 * 0.24 1.27 1.54 * 0.28 1.32 1.68 **
CLASSIFIED BOARD (-) -0.13 0.88 -1.43 * -0.08 0.92 -0.72 -0.17 0.85 -1.33 *
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 0.01 1.01 0.07 0.01 1.01 0.03 -0.25 0.78 -1.12
AUDIT QUALITY (+) 0.03 1.03 0.14 -0.22 0.81 -0.92 -0.06 0.94 -0.18
LITIGATION RISK (+) 0.16 1.17 1.46 * 0.30 1.35 3.11 *** 0.28 1.33 1.37 *
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE -0.12 0.89 -0.95 -0.22 0.80 -2.04 ** -0.41 0.66 -2.75 ***
LEASE ISSUE 0.40 1.49 2.53 ** 0.43 1.53 2.29 ** 0.53 1.70 2.72 ***
INVENTORY ISSUE 0.08 1.08 0.64 0.14 1.15 1.03 0.27 1.30 1.50
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE -0.46 0.63 -3.16 *** -0.56 0.57 -3.48 *** -0.68 0.50 -3.89 ***
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.03 1.03 0.27 0.21 1.24 1.76 *
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE -0.33 0.72 -2.35 ** -0.39 0.68 -2.63 *** -0.53 0.59 -2.37 **
ACCRUALS ISSUE -0.03 0.97 -0.25 -0.01 0.99 -0.13 -0.04 0.96 -0.32
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE -0.04 0.96 -0.17 -0.26 0.77 -1.01 -0.01 0.99 -0.05
MISSTATEMENT DURATION (+) 0.08 1.09 3.57 *** 0.08 1.08 2.57 *** 0.07 1.07 1.83 **
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME (-) -0.51 0.60 -1.63 * -0.49 0.61 -1.34 * -0.76 0.47 -1.58 *
POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT (+) -0.15 0.86 -0.80 -0.24 0.79 -1.16
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT (+) -0.06 0.95 -0.44 -0.04 0.96 -0.33
FIRM SIZE [ln(total assets)] (+) 0.05 1.05 1.06 0.10 1.10 2.80 *** 0.11 1.12 2.87 **
FIRM LEVERAGE (-) -0.30 0.74 -1.33 * -0.03 0.97 -0.12 0.10 1.10 0.33
Industry & Year Dummies No No No No No Yes
Cluster Adj. Std. Errors: Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Statistics
n 302 302 302 302 302 302
Wald ChiSqd 60.1 *** 19.9 *** 3.5 162.1 *** 1239.4 *** 245684.1 ***
Model 6Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
i i i i i i
i i i i
, , ,
,
 TIMELINESS IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE CEO OWNERSHIP ,CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED BOARD INDEPENDENCE ,
BOARD SIZE , CEO TURNOVER CFO TURNOVER ,CLASSIFIED BOARD ,INSTITUTIONAL 
i
i i i
i
, ,
,
OWNERSHIP AUDIT QUALITY ,LITIGATION RISK
MISSTATEMENT CHARACTERISTICS , FIRM CHARACTERISTICS YEAR DUMMIES, INDUSTRY DUMMIES)
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Table 5 uses a Cox Partial Likelhood model and provides the resulting hazard ratios representing the influence of internal and external corporate governance on misstatement disclosure timeliness.  Ties  in TIMELINESS are broken using Breslow (1974) approximation.
Continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent with the exception of the dependent variable (TIMELINESS) to mitigate the influence of outliers.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on a one-tail test if the expectation is given, else a two-tail test.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the misstatement disclosure date; IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the 
misstatement end date and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-
EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money un-exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying
stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); CEO OWNERSHIP measures the CEO's stockholdings in the misstating firm at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is 
calculated by dividing the number of shares owned by the CEO by the number of shares outstanding; BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the number of outside directors by the total number of directors both measured at the end of the year preceding the 
end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors serving on the board measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced in the 
year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CFO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the board has two or more classes of directors at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is calculated by dividing the number of shares  held by institutional 
owners by the number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated period 
and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION RISK is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication services, or utilities) at the end of the misstatement period and 0 
otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold 
and 0 otherwise; MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to selling, general, or administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the 
misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to accruals and 0 otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT DURATION is the number of misstated quarters divided by 4; MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured 
as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-first-reported net income over the misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002 
and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets one 
year prior to the end of the misstated period; FIRM LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total assets both measured one year prior to the end of the misstated period.
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Table 6
Misstatement disclosure transparency and corporate governance
DV = DISCLOSURE IN 8-K
Independent Variables E Coef. z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. z stat.
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE (-) -0.018 -1.57 * 0.048 1.67 ** -0.065 -2.88 ***
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE -0.016 -0.47 -0.093 -0.88 0.033 0.51
CEO OWNERSHIP (+) 1.796 0.34 -4.997 -0.61 16.024 1.08
CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED (-) -3.143 -0.35 9.825 0.67 -31.709 -1.40 *
BOARD INDEPENDENCE (+) -3.671 -2.18 -1.732 -0.64 -15.162 -3.03
BOARD SIZE (-) 0.059 0.65 0.107 0.79 -0.046 -0.23
CEO TURNOVER (+) -0.250 -0.54 -0.348 -0.54 -0.529 -0.67
CFO TURNOVER (+) -0.390 -0.98 -0.268 -0.45 -0.834 -1.07
CLASSIFIED BOARD (-) -0.782 -2.19 ** -0.727 -1.09 -1.438 -1.93 **
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP -0.221 -0.49 -0.481 -0.59 -0.603 -0.76
AUDIT QUALITY (+) -0.123 -0.21 -0.681 -0.60 0.586 0.40
LITIGATION RISK (+) 0.479 1.06 0.274 0.40 0.103 0.14
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE 1.053 2.86 *** 0.630 1.18 2.012 2.08 **
LEASE ISSUE 0.082 0.14 1.090 1.32 -0.363 -0.37
INVENTORY ISSUE -0.476 -1.04 -0.367 -0.63 -1.013 -1.09
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE 0.152 0.29 0.457 0.63 -0.130 -0.16
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE 0.104 0.25 1.226 1.93 * -1.496 -1.21
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE -0.033 -0.07 -1.772 -2.10 ** 0.396 0.38
ACCRUALS ISSUE -0.123 -0.31 0.681 1.15 -0.565 -0.70
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE -0.231 -0.17 -0.591 -0.45
MISSTATEMENT DURATION (+) 0.261 2.67 *** 0.039 0.23 0.276 1.26
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME (-) -2.169 -0.52 -3.696 -0.67 -0.385 -0.11
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT (+) 3.144 1.96 **
FIRM SIZE [ln(total assets)] (+) -0.282 -2.17 ** -0.148 -0.72 -0.542 -1.52 *
FIRM LEVERAGE (-) 0.342 0.42 -0.657 -0.47 2.324 1.35 *
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes
White Robust Std Errors Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 1.551 0.64 3.908 1.67 * 18.814 4.01 ***
Model Statistics
n 254 124 130
Wald ChiSqd 77.85 *** 33.50 62.28 **
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Full sub-sample Pre Final-Rule 8-K
 sub-sample
Post Final-Rule 8-K
 sub-sample
Table 6 presents the results from a logit regression of the decision to disclose in Form 8-K on the independent and control variables from the main study.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on a one-tail test if the expectation is given, else a two-tail test.
DISCLOSURE IN 8-K takes the value of 1 if the misstatement is disclosed within the Form 8-K and 0 if disclosed in the 10-K or 10-Q; IN-THE-MONEY 
EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the misstatement end date and is 
calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option 
shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money un-exercisable stock 
options at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market 
price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); CEO OWNERSHIP
measures the CEO's stockholdings in the misstating firm at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by dividing the number 
of shares owned by the CEO by the number of shares outstanding; BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the number of outside directors by the total 
number of directors both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors serving on the board 
measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was 
replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CFO was 
replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board 
has two or more classes of directors at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is 
calculated by dividing the number of shares  held by institutional owners by the number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end 
of the misstatement period; AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated 
period and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION RISK is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care,
information technology, telecommunication services, or utilities) at the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST 
OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold and 
0 otherwise; MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related 
to a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the 
misstatement was related to selling, general, or administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to accruals and 0 otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT DURATION is the 
number of misstated quarters divided by 4; MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-
first-reported net income over the misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement 
disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002 and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
misstatement disclosure occurs after August 23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets one year prior to the 
end of the misstated period; FIRM LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total assets both measured one year prior to the end 
of the misstated period.
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Table 7
Accounting error sample selection and descriptive statistics
Panel A: Sample selection
Accounting irregularities (initial sample) 2,121
Less missing misstatement data 1,026
Final sample 1,095
Panel B: Descriptive statistics
n Mean Standard Deviation 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
TIMELINESS 1095 189.31 129.65 121.00 145.00 213.00
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE 318 4.61 10.54 0.08 1.42 4.54
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE 318 1.64 2.87 0.00 0.49 1.67
CEO OWNERSHIP 7 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.27
BOARD INDEPENDENCE 240 0.67 0.15 0.57 0.70 0.80
BOARD SIZE 240 9.35 2.89 7.00 9.00 11.00
CEO TURNOVER 316 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00
CFO TURNOVER 79 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
CLASSIFIED BOARD 152 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 821 0.46 0.33 0.14 0.46 0.75
AUDIT QUALITY 1095 0.79 0.41 1.00 1.00 1.00
LITIGATION RISK 1051 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE 1095 0.21 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
LEASE ISSUE 1095 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
INVENTORY ISSUE 1095 0.10 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE 1095 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE 1095 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE 1095 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
ACCRUALS ISSUE 1095 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE 1095 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
MISSTATEMENT DURATION 1095 2.05 1.56 0.75 1.75 3.00
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME 1044 -0.007 0.053 -0.002 0.000 0.000
POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT 1095 0.86 0.34 1.00 1.00 1.00
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT 1095 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
FIRM SIZE [ln(total assets)] 1044 5.66 2.19 4.14 5.66 7.14
FIRM LEVERAGE 1042 0.20 0.24 0.00 0.12 0.31
Table 7 describes the accounting error sample.  Continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent with the exception of the dependent 
variable (TIMELINESS) to mitigate the influence of outliers.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the misstatement disclosure date; IN-THE-MONEY 
EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the misstatement end date and is 
calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of 
option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money un-
exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike 
price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); 
CEO OWNERSHIP measures the CEO's stockholdings in the misstating firm at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is 
calculated by dividing the number of shares owned by the CEO by the number of shares outstanding; BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the 
number of outside directors by the total number of directors both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE
is the number of directors serving on the board measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CFO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED 
BOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board has two or more classes of directors at the end of the year preceding the end of the 
misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is calculated by dividing the number of shares  held by institutional owners by the 
number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated period and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION RISK is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication services, or 
utilities) at the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold and 0 otherwise; MERGERS 
& ACQUISITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to a merger or 
acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement 
was related to selling, general, or administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to accruals and 0 otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT DURATION
is the number of misstated quarters divided by 4; MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income 
and the as-first-reported net income over the misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
misstatement disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002 and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets one year prior to the end of the misstated period; FIRM LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total assets both 
measured one year prior to the end of the misstated period.
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Table 8
Misstatement disclosure timeliness: Accounting error sample - Proportional Hazard Model (Cox Partial Likelihood)
Independent Variables E Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat. Coef. H. Ratio z stat.
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE (-) 0.01 1.01 4.03 0.02 1.02 2.91 0.01 1.01 2.17 0.01 1.01 1.60
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE -0.01 0.99 -0.29 0.01 1.01 0.60 0.01 1.01 0.52 -0.01 0.99 -0.62
BOARD INDEPENDENCE (+) 0.83 2.30 2.03 ** 0.67 1.96 1.37 * 1.05 2.85 1.44 *
BOARD SIZE (-) 0.06 1.06 2.12 0.06 1.06 2.15 0.09 1.10 3.26
CEO TURNOVER (+)
CFO TURNOVER (+)
CLASSIFIED BOARD (-) -0.22 0.80 -0.93
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 0.45 1.58 4.79 *** 0.03 1.03 0.07 -0.15 0.86 -0.49 -0.58 0.56 -1.23
AUDIT QUALITY (+) -0.10 0.90 -0.94 1.82 6.19 2.52 *** 0.78 2.18 2.51 *** 0.79 2.20 1.37 *
LITIGATION RISK (+) 0.20 1.23 3.59 *** 0.29 1.34 1.80 ** 0.17 1.18 1.13 -0.08 0.92 -0.32
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE 0.09 1.09 1.31 0.00 1.00 -0.05 -0.36 0.70 -1.54 0.12 1.12 1.16 -0.06 0.94 -0.47 -0.09 0.91 -0.64 0.00 1.00 0.00
LEASE ISSUE 0.10 1.10 0.94 0.04 1.04 0.37 0.18 1.19 0.94 0.28 1.32 2.30 ** 0.35 1.42 2.70 *** 0.39 1.48 2.59 *** 0.32 1.37 0.81
INVENTORY ISSUE 0.15 1.16 2.86 *** 0.21 1.23 1.97 ** 0.29 1.33 0.85 0.01 1.01 0.03 0.26 1.30 0.87 0.23 1.26 0.82 0.48 1.61 1.20
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE 0.02 1.02 0.18 0.00 1.00 -0.03 -0.17 0.84 -0.59 -0.09 0.91 -0.50 -0.21 0.81 -0.88 -0.21 0.81 -0.88 -0.18 0.83 -0.52
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE -0.03 0.97 -0.55 -0.08 0.92 -0.99 0.19 1.21 0.63 -0.06 0.94 -0.28 -0.15 0.86 -0.57 -0.02 0.98 -0.08 0.09 1.10 0.27
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE -0.02 0.98 -0.28 -0.09 0.91 -0.78 0.48 1.61 1.02 -0.13 0.88 -0.44 -0.13 0.88 -0.39 -0.01 0.99 -0.03 -0.21 0.81 -0.38
ACCRUALS ISSUE -0.22 0.80 -1.75 * -0.18 0.84 -1.45 -0.79 0.45 -2.87 *** -0.25 0.78 -1.36 -0.33 0.72 -1.39 -0.44 0.65 -1.79 * -0.35 0.71 -1.30
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE 0.03 1.03 0.26 -0.09 0.91 -0.72 0.94 2.55 2.04 ** 0.15 1.16 0.96 0.26 1.30 1.06 0.50 1.65 1.67 * 0.54 1.71 1.45
MISSTATEMENT DURATION (+) 0.04 1.04 2.32 ** 0.04 1.04 1.88 ** 0.05 1.05 1.06 0.03 1.03 0.88 0.03 1.03 0.49 0.03 1.03 0.44 0.07 1.07 0.98
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME (-) 0.09 1.09 0.13 -1.13 0.32 -1.00 -13.52 0.00 -1.50 * -7.90 0.00 -3.43 *** -10.49 0.00 -4.33 *** -12.18 0.00 -5.27 *** -10.93 0.00 -3.07 ***
POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT (+) -0.25 0.78 -2.48 -0.30 0.74 -2.23 -0.44 0.64 -0.84 -0.32 0.72 -1.30 -0.45 0.64 -1.17 -0.46 0.63 -0.91
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT (+) 0.33 1.40 5.25 *** 0.28 1.32 3.82 *** 0.78 2.19 3.19 *** 0.25 1.28 2.05 *** 0.22 1.25 1.55 * 0.25 1.28 1.73 **
FIRM SIZE [ln(total assets)] (+) 0.05 1.05 3.19 *** 0.01 1.01 0.61 0.00 1.00 -0.05 0.09 1.10 3.91 *** 0.01 1.01 0.16 -0.02 0.98 -0.29 -0.09 0.92 -1.20
FIRM LEVERAGE (-) -0.10 0.90 -0.95 0.09 1.09 0.47 -0.23 0.80 -0.61 0.03 1.03 0.10 0.05 1.06 0.12 0.09 1.10 0.16 0.69 1.99 0.64
Industry & Year Dummies No No No No No No Yes
Cluster Adj. Std. Errors: Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Statistics
n 1023 787 133 311 230 214 214
Wald ChiSqd 444.0 *** 26895.9 *** 27077.6 *** 351598.9 *** 8889.2 *** 13704.0 *** 5904.1 ***
Model 7Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Table 8 uses a Cox Partial Likelhood model and provides the resulting hazard ratios representing the influence of internal and external corporate governance on misstatement disclosure timeliness for an accounting error sample.  Ties  in TIMELINESS are broken using Breslow (1974) approximation.
Continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent with the exception of the dependent variable (TIMELINESS) to mitigate the influence of outliers.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on a one-tail test if the expectation is given, else a two-tail test.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the misstatement disclosure date; IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the misstatement end date and is 
calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE measures  the value of the CEO's in-the-money 
un-exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay 
(salary + bonus); BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the number of outside directors by the total number of directors both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors serving on the board measured at the end of 
the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CFO was 
replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board has two or more classes of directors at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL 
OWNERSHIP is calculated by dividing the number of shares  held by institutional owners by the number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X 
auditor contracted at the end of the misstated period and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION RISK is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication services, or utilities) at the end of the misstatement 
period and 0 otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue 
involved in the misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold and 0 otherwise; MERGERS & ACQUISITION 
ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to 
selling, general, or administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to accruals and 0 otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT 
DURATION is the number of misstated quarters divided by 4; MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-first-reported net income over the misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002 and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets one year prior to the end of the misstated period; FIRM LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total assets both measured one year prior to the end of the misstated period.
i i i i i i
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